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Until relatively recently, the appointment of a special
purpose liquidator (“SPL”) was largely confined to
proven situations of actual or perceived conflict (or lack
of independence) on the part of the incumbent liquida-
tor.1 However, in recent years courts have demonstrated
a willingness to entertain the appointment of a SPL in
circumstances where no specific concerns are demon-
strated with respect to the independence, conduct or
judgment of the incumbent liquidator. Today, it appears
that where a creditor simply desires a preferred, alter-
native liquidator to carry out a legitimate investiga-
tion — and is only prepared to fund that liquidator and
no other — the courts may consider that is enough to
conclude that the appointment of a SPL would be “both
just, and of sufficient utility to the external administra-
tion”.2
This “new”, more accommodative attitude of courts
to SPL appointments appeared to reach its zenith in
Williams & Kersten Pty Ltd v Walton Constructions
(Qld) Pty Ltd (in liq), in the matter of Walton Construc-
tion (Qld) Pty Ltd (in liq) (“Walton Constructions”).3 In
Walton Constructions the Court appointed a SPL to
provide a “second opinion” on the incumbent liquida-
tor’s completed assessment of some potential recovery
claims. Notwithstanding the absence of any conflict or
criticism of the liquidator’s performance, the appoint-
ment of a “second opinion” SPL was obtained by two
creditors who were prepared to fund that SPL and no
other. Importantly, the SPL was empowered to not only
investigate but also litigate the relevant claims (which
the incumbent liquidators were not intending to pursue).
The “second opinion” SPL appointment in Walton
Constructions raises legitimate legal and policy ques-
tions regarding the justification and use of SPLs. Is this
recent shift in judicial attitude a cause for concern or is
it a welcome extension of creditors’ rights? Do “the ends
justify the means” whenever there is a live prospect of a
privately-funded recovery at no apparent cost to the
existing external administration?
Further, a very recent decision of the Supreme Court
of Victoria in In the matter of Aus Streaming (in Liq)4
suggests that open questions of statutory construction
remain regarding the factors that are relevant to a court’s
exercise of discretion to appoint a SPL.
The context and basis for the “second
opinion” SPL in Walton Constructions
In Walton Constructions two creditors sought the
appointment of a SPL that would be empowered to
investigate and pursue claims — arising from antecedent
transactions — that the incumbent liquidators had already
assessed as unviable. It is noteworthy that the incumbent
liquidators, in making that assessment, “had obtained
advice on two separate occasions from different law-
yers” which suggests that any legal advice obtained by
the SPL would in fact be a third opinion on the potential
claims. The liquidators had already obtained judgment
in a claim they did opt to pursue — for an uncommercial
transaction — in McCann, in the matter of Walton
Construction (Qld) Pty Ltd (in Liq) v QHT Investments
Pty Ltd.5
Reeves J made the appointment of the SPL under
s 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corpora-
tions) (“IPS”) notwithstanding that the applicant credi-
tors “levelled no criticism of the conduct of the Liquidators …
nor … criticised their decision not to commence a
proceeding of the kind they want the SPL to investigate
and consider commencing”. Reeves J considered that the
circumstances of the antecedent transactions “warrant
further investigation and the obtaining of the ‘second
opinion’” sought by the applicant creditors. Signifi-
cantly, the fees and expenses of the SPL were not to be
paid out of company property available for general
unsecured creditors (apart, of course, from proceeds of
the claims the SPL was empowered to bring). The risk of
pursuing the potential recovery proceedings would be
borne by the applicant creditors, the SPL and any
relevant litigation funder.
Understandably, the incumbent liquidators made the
decision to neither consent to nor oppose the SPL
appointment sought by the two applicant creditors on the
condition that the SPL was effectively ring fenced from
the rest of the liquidation in terms of costs, funding and
tasks (including an assurance that the SPL’s activities
would not “cut across” other actions the incumbent
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liquidators were pursuing). Therefore, there was no
effective contradictor on the question of whether the
SPL appointment should be made.
The“new”judicialattitudetoSPLappointments
An application for a SPL appointment can be viewed
as a request for a “partial replacement” of an incumbent
liquidator: the incumbent’s responsibility for a particular
task or matter (usually a required investigation) is
replaced by the authority and responsibility of the SPL
to conduct that specific part of the external administra-
tion. For this reason, cases dealing with applications for
the “entire” removal and replacement of a liquidator can
be instructive when considering the merits of a SPL in
certain situations. The willingness of courts to appoint a
creditor’s preferred SPL to investigate a matter when a
creditor refuses to fund an incumbent, independent
liquidator represents a shift in judicial attitude from that
expressed in earlier authorities.
There have been instances of judicial reluctance to
accede to a creditor’s request for a preferred insolvency
practitioner. Re Evcorp Grains Pty Ltd ACN 134 204
050 (No 2)6 involved an application to wind up a
company by court order and replace an incumbent
voluntary liquidator. Brereton J dismissed the applica-
tion and stated:7
In the present case, the grounds advanced by the plaintiff do
not impugn the independence of the voluntary liquidator,
nor assert that he has acted in any such way as would justify
his removal. Nor is it suggested that his replacement with a
court-appointed liquidator would result in the latter having
any powers or being entitled to any remedies that the
former would not. Rather, the plaintiff’s case was that …
[inter alia] the plaintiff would be prepared to fund its
liquidator (but presumably not the voluntary liquidator) to
conduct investigations and recover any amounts that might
be recoverable in respect of voidable transactions and/or
insolvent trading. As to the last point, the Court should not
accede to a party’s preference for a particular liquidator on
account of its threat or promise to fund that liquidator but
no other. To do so would encourage parties to be selective
in their funding of liquidators for an irrelevant reason, and
effectively abdicate the Court’s responsibility to select an
appropriate, rather than a party’s preferred, liquidator:
Emerton Pty Ltd v Referral Marketing Services Pty Ltd
[2009] NSWSC 738, [27]. (emphasis added)
Emerton Pty Ltd v Referral Marketing Services Pty
Ltd8 (“Emerton”) was another, earlier “entire replace-
ment” case: ie, an application to remove and replace an
incumbent liquidator in a creditors’ voluntary winding
up. A shareholder/creditor complained that the incum-
bent liquidators had “not diligently investigated” alleged
breaches of a director’s duties while the reality was that
there were no funds available to the liquidators to
conduct an “extensive” investigation.9 The shareholder/
creditor was not prepared to fund an investigation by the
incumbent liquidators and instead sought the appoint-
ment of its preferred liquidator to investigate. The
incumbent liquidators were content to resign upon the
appointment of a replacement, but Brereton J decided
that an order for removal and replacement would be
required.
In considering the identity of the appointee, Brereton J
said that “in the usual case, all else being equal, and
nothing being advanced contrary to the fitness of either
nominee, the plaintiff’s nominee will ordinarily be
appointed”.10 However, Brereton J also stated that a
liquidator conducting required investigations “does not
do so as the agent of an aggrieved creditor” and noted
that the creditor concerned had been seeking the appoint-
ment of its preferred liquidator for some 18 months.
Brereton J then concluded:11
The Court should not be forced to accede to a party’s
selection of a liquidator by a statement that a creditor is
prepared to fund only a particular liquidator. In my view,
having regard to the course of the proceedings to this point,
if the Court were to accede to … [the creditor’s] application
in this respect, there would be an appearance of acceding
to … [the creditor’s] sustained attempts to have the
liquidator of its choice appointed. This would … allow the
proceedings to become a vehicle for the plaintiff to secure
the appointment, not of an appropriate liquidator, but of the
plaintiff’s preferred liquidator. That circumstance, I think,
takes the case out of the usual class to which I have
referred. In those circumstances, I am not prepared to
appoint … [the creditor’s preferred liquidator]. To do so
would have too much the appearance of acceding to the
plaintiff’s choice of a preferred liquidator, rather than
appointment of an impartial or an appropriate liquidator.
(emphasis added)
However, this earlier reticence of Brereton J towards
creditor-preferred liquidators does not appear to have
found favour in subsequent cases where other judges
have had few qualms in replacing liquidators where an
investigation was warranted and the applicant creditor
was only prepared to fund a particular liquidator (despite
the absence of any demonstrated unfitness, impropriety
or breach of duty on the part of the incumbent).
In Termicide Pest Control Pty Ltd, in the matter of
Granitgard Pty Ltd (in liq) v Albarran12 the Court
viewed the financial resources accessible by the pre-
ferred liquidator as the determining factor in what was
otherwise a “finely balanced case”. More recently, the
decisions in GDK Projects Pty Ltd, in the matter of
Umberto Pty Ltd (in liq) v Umberto Pty Ltd (in liq)13 and
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, in the matter of
Italian Prestige Jewellery Pty Ltd (in liq) ACN 116 031
022 v Italian Prestige Jewellery Pty Ltd14 are
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examples of courts appointing SPLs in circumstances
where:
• the applicant creditor was prepared to fund only its
preferred liquidator; and
• there was no substantive complaint regarding the
incumbent liquidator, other than a vague dissatis-
faction or lack of confidence in the incumbent
liquidators (either by dint of the voluntary nature
of their appointment by the company or with
respect to the progress of certain investigations in
circumstances where the incumbents had limited
or no funding).
In considering whether an antecedent transaction
should be investigated by the incumbent liquidator or
the proposed replacement, it is unsurprising that judges
will give considerable weight to the replacement’s
access to funding and conclude that a SPL appointment
is “for the better conduct of the liquidation” (as they did
in all three cases just mentioned).15
Even so, the advent of the “second opinion” SPL in
Walton Constructions represents a further, controversial
extension of the court’s jurisdiction to appoint a SPL.
The distinguishing feature of the appointment of a
“second opinion” SPL is that the key investigations have
been completed by the incumbent liquidator and conse-
quential decisions have been made (eg, to not pursue a
recovery claim assessed as unviable nor initiate court
proceedings). An application for a “second opinion”
SPL does not raise the question of which insolvency
practitioner is better placed carry out a required inves-
tigation; rather, it is a request of a court to disturb or
revisit the commercial judgment of an independent,
incumbent liquidator.
Challenging the legal basis for a “second
opinion” SPL
Before canvassing the legal (and policy) grounds
upon which the legitimacy of a “second opinion” SPL
might be questioned, it is important to acknowledge the
key considerations usually submitted in favour of such
an appointment:
• The applicants’ proposed funding arrangements
invariably ensure that no cost to the general
liquidation or the interests of creditors will be
occasioned by the SPL;16
• From the perspective of the general unsecured
creditors, there is nothing to be lost and there is the
possibility of a gain (dividend) if a recovery is
achieved by the SPL;
• The “different perspective”17 provided by a “sec-
ond opinion” SPL promotes creditors’ rights and
participation in liquidations and incentivises fund-
ing to support investigations and recovery proceed-
ings where such funding would otherwise not
materialise (what might be described as “public
interest” factors).
However, the appointment of a mere, “second opin-
ion” SPL — in the absence of any conflict or perfor-
mance issue afflicting the incumbent liquidator — sits in
tension with authorities dealing with requests to inter-
fere in matters of commercial judgment of an incumbent
liquidator.
“Second-guessing” the commercial
judgment of a liquidator
In Honest Remark Pty Ltd v Allstate Explorations NL
[2006] NSWSC 735; BC200605562, a case involving a
voluntary administration, Brereton J refused an order for
a “special purpose administrator” sought for the purpose
of investigating aspects of the incumbent’s conduct of
the administration. Brereton J described the issue in the
application as “whether there is power to appoint a
special purpose administrator for the purpose of inves-
tigating and reporting to the court on the original
administrators’ conduct of their administration.”18
Brereton J found that such a purpose was impermissible.
In reaching that conclusion, Brereton J canvassed a
line of earlier authorities where SPLs had been appointed
by the Court, including:
• Re Obie Pty Ltd (No 2) [1984] 2 Qd R 155, where
the Court appointed a SPL to investigate the
company’s potential claim against an accounting
firm of which the two incumbent liquidators were
a current and former partner. The claim arose out
of pre-liquidation advice provided by the firm to
the company, not from the conduct of the liquida-
tion by the incumbent liquidators. Significantly,
Thomas J stated that a liquidator’s decision regard-
ing the viability of a claim of the company in
liquidation:
will eventually have to be taken by a liquidator after
assessing the available evidence, the strength of the
material available to the other side, and the probable
economic advantage or disadvantage to the com-
pany. In short, it will be the sort of decision that
liquidators frequently have to make in the course of
a winding up. It will require commercial judgment as
well as legal advice; (emphasis added)
• Re Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1990) 4 ACSR
555, where a SPL was appointed to oversee an
aspect of a liquidation involving a potential claim
against a third party company of which the incum-
bent liquidators’ firms were auditors;
• Onefone Australia Pty Ltd v One.Tel Ltd (in liq)
(2003) 48 ACSR 562; [2003] NSWSC 1228;
BC200307964, in which a SPL was appointed for
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the purpose of investigating any claims which
might exist in relation to a pre-liquidation cancel-
lation of a rights issue with which the incumbent
liquidators had some involvement just prior to
being appointed as administrators. Windeyer J
observed that “the original liquidators might be
joined to the prospective litigation, which would
place them in an almost impossible position”.
It is noteworthy that in every one of the SPL cases
considered by Brereton J in Honest Remark:
• The court had considered a situation of conflict or
lack of independence that raised a legitimate
concern for the incumbent liquidator carrying out
a certain task (usually because of the incumbent’s
interest in the outcome of a required investiga-
tion);
• There was no suggestion of the SPL revisiting the
outcome of an investigation already carried out by
an independent liquidator; and
• The purpose of the appointed SPL was not to
investigate the incumbent liquidator’s conduct of
the liquidation.
On this last point, Brereton J stated:
There are very good reasons why this is so. The investiga-
tion of the conduct of a liquidator qua liquidator is not part
of the matters entrusted to a liquidator; it is a supervisory
function of the court. The court does not readily embark on
or permit inquiries into the conduct of liquidators, in the
absence of conduct liable to attract sanctions or control for
what might broadly be described as disciplinary reasons.
Brereton J then drew some instructive conclusions on
the nature and function of a SPL:
[I]n Naumoski v Parbery (2002) 171 FLR 332, the …
judge, holding that the court should not interfere with the
exercise of a liquidator’s statutory powers, a fortiori where
the decision was one of commercial judgment, cited the
words of C E Harman J in Re Debtor [1949] Ch 236 at 241,
that “administration in bankruptcy would be impossible if
the trustee must answer at every step to the bankrupt for the
exercise of his powers and discretions in the management
and realisation of the property” …
A special purpose liquidator is appointed to co-exist with
the existing liquidators, to fulfil a specific purpose which
would otherwise form part of the responsibilities of the
original liquidator, but which is carved out from those
usual responsibilities because of diffıculties in the original
liquidator performing it. Because the investigation of the
conduct of a liquidator is not part of the matters entrusted
to a liquidator, but a supervisory function of the court, an
investigation by one of several liquidators into the conduct
of another in the liquidation does not involve carving out of
the liquidation a part of the ordinary responsibilities of the
liquidator. To the contrary, it involves circumventing the
ordinary and proper procedures for supervision of liquida-
tors, and the protections that attend them. (emphasis
added)
Providing for “the better conduct” of a
liquidation or challenging decisions made
during the conduct of a liquidation?
These observations by Brereton J in Honest Remark
regarding the nature of a SPL are pertinent to a court’s
exercise of discretion to appoint a SPL solely for the
purpose of obtaining a “second opinion” on a liquida-
tor’s commercial judgment. Once a commercial
judgment has been made — and a decision taken — by
a liquidator, it could be said that the appropriate recourse
for any party dissatisfied with that decision is to invoke
the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Div 90 of the
IPS to review that decision. Of course, upon such an
application, the aggrieved stakeholder would ordinarily
be expected to demonstrate grounds for legitimate con-
cern regarding the decision that was made and not
simply make a bald request for a review de novo.
Indeed, prior to the amendments to the Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Act”) made by the Insolvency Law
Reform Act 2016 (Cth) (“ILRA”), the distinction between
challenging a decision of a liquidator and seeking the
liquidator’s removal and replacement had received judi-
cial support. In Domino Hire v Pioneer Park19 Austin J
stated that “if the complaint relates to a particular
decision of the liquidator, it seems to me that the
appropriate course is to appeal to the Court under
s 1321, even if the substance of the complaint is that the
decision demonstrates incompetence or bias or other
unfitness for office.”20
The ILRA repealed s 1321 of the Act and challenges
to decisions of liquidators are now brought under
s 90-15 of the IPS, the same provision under which any
appointment of a SPL is sought and made. Section 90-15
is cast in broader terms than the various provisions of the
Act it replaced. However, surely a distinction should still
be drawn between:
• A question of the responsibility for the future
(better) conduct of a liquidation (or part of it); and
• A question regarding the past conduct of a liqui-
dation — specifically, a creditor’s dissatisfaction
with the outcome of a commercial judgment and
decision that was reasonably open to the incum-
bent liquidator.
The same point appeared to arise in Melhelm Pty Ltd,
in the matter of Boka Beverages Pty Ltd (in liq) v Boka
Beverages Pty Ltd (in liq).21 An asserted creditor, whose
proof of debt had been rejected, successfully applied for
the appointment of a SPL to conduct certain investiga-
tions. Curiously, the SPL sought by the applicant was
appointed not only to pursue the required investigations
but to also revisit the proof of debt (previously rejected
by the general purpose liquidator) and decide whether to
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revoke that decision under reg 5.6.55 of the Corpora-
tions Regulations 2001 (Cth). The perceived lack of
independence of a SPL reviewing a rejected proof of
debt lodged by the very party that sought that SPL’s
appointment did not appear to trouble the Court (nor did
the fact that reg 5.6.54 specifically provides for an
appeal to the Court against a rejected proof of debt). Far
from addressing a situation of conflict, it could be
contended that this particular SPL appointment created a
conflict where none previously existed.22
Special considerations for court-appointed
liquidators?
Brereton J’s reference (in Honest Remark) to courts’
protection of their own processes and officers also raises
a question whether the decision to appoint a SPL — to
co-exist with an incumbent court-appointed liquida-
tor — attracts its own, specific considerations. There is
a substantial line of authority for the proposition that
courts will provide a significant degree of protection to
their officers who have exercised and discharged their
role and powers in a reasonable and proper manner. In
the recent decision of Aardwolf Industries LLC v Riad
Tayeh,23 Rees J of the NSW Supreme Court refused to
grant leave to sue two joint liquidators and paid regard
to the following judicial statements of principle:24
• “[t]he court will be very jealous of its delegate
exercising the powers that it is given [under the
Corporations Act] … and will take every precau-
tion to make sure that those powers are used
impartially and for a proper purpose … and will
not permit its officers to be sued by a creditor or
have an inquiry made under s 536 unless it is
satisfied that there is a prima facie case”;25
• “The discretionary power of the Court to grant
leave [to sue a liquidator] must be exercised
having regard to all the circumstances of the
particular cases and bearing in mind the need to
protect the integrity of its process. It does not
necessarily follow that, in order to obtain leave, a
prima facie case must be demonstrated. There is
no specific threshold appropriate in all cases,
however there must be more than mere assertion.
The Court’s discretion may be exercised on many
grounds including, but not limited to, the suffi-
ciency of the evidence adduced as to the prospect
of success of the action on the application for
leave”;26
• “[A] court appointed liquidator … undertakes
[his/her role] as a representative of the court.
When acting in such a position, the court takes the
view that the actions of the appointed offıcial are
to be deemed as actions of the court. This propo-
sition can be traced back to a decision of Lord
Chancellor Brougham in Aston v Heron (1834) 2
My & K 390 at 396–7; 39 ER 993 at 995 … and
‘there is a close relationship between a court and a
court-appointed liquidator; so much so that it will
protect the liquidator as one of its officers, through
the same processes by which it will protect its own
processes.”27 (emphasis added)
One might ask whether a court would be undermining
the integrity of its own winding up processes (and
indeed its officers) by appointing a SPL to revisit a
matter of commercial judgment simply because one
creditor is not prepared to accept the outcome of a
reasonably-made decision of an incumbent, court-
appointed liquidator.
Is a “second opinion” SPL simply a de facto
“reviewing liquidator”?
If a court can in any event appoint a “reviewing
liquidator” under Div 90 of the IPS (eg, for the purpose
of revisiting an incumbent’s concluded investigation and
associated decision), do the concerns for “second opin-
ion” SPLs lose any force? If a “second opinion” SPL
were to serve the same role as a “reviewing liquidator”
does it really matter how the role is described? This
question can be answered in three points:
• A SPL and a reviewing liquidator are appointed
under different provisions of the IPS;
• The “second opinion” SPL appointed in Walton
Constructions was authorised to conduct another
investigation and to pursue those relevant claims
as liquidator (including initiating court proceed-
ings). This is a broader suite of powers than those
enjoyed by a reviewing liquidator who simply
conducts a review commissioned by the Court and
“reports back”. A reviewing liquidator is empow-
ered to review a matter but not to conduct any
aspect of the liquidation, let alone litigate a claim
of the company: IPRs s 90-22;
• The competing considerations observed by courts
in exercising the jurisdiction to appoint a SPL are
equally relevant to ASIC or a Court determining
whether the appointment of a reviewing liquidator
is “appropriate”: IPS s 90-23(1) and (7).
In summary, there are good reasons for future courts
to carefully consider whether the weight of authority and
the new legislative framework of Div 90 permits the
appointment of a SPL for the purpose of fulfilling a
creditor’s bald request to revisit (or “interfere with”) the
reasonable, commercial judgment of an incumbent liq-
uidator.
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Open questions regarding the proper
construction of IPS s 90-15: Recent VSC
decision
Some of the above points were very recently endorsed
(albeit in obiter) by Justice Connock of the Victorian
Supreme Court. In the matter of Aus Streaming (in liq)28
was ultimately a straightforward decision to appoint a
SPL for the “confined” purpose of conducting certain
investigations. However, Connock J made a passing
reference to the above-mentioned reasoning of Brereton J
in Honest Remark and stated:29
Although these observations were made prior to the intro-
duction of … s 90-15, their underlying force appears to
continue to resonate in the context of applications for the
appointment of special purpose liquidators made pursuant
to s 90-15 — at least so far as the exercise of discretion is
concerned. Whether or not the same force remains in
relation to the question of the court’s power under s 90-15
to make such an order need not be explored given the facts
of the present application … If the occasion arises for this
issue to be considered in the future, no doubt one of the
relevant matters will be the extent to which, if any, the
specific review powers set out in subdivision C of Sched-
ule 2 [ie, appointment of a reviewing liquidator] impact
upon the proper construction of s 90-15(1) in this regard.
Policy concerns regarding “second
opinion” SPLs
The case law canvassed above also highlights genu-
ine policy considerations surrounding the emergence of
“second opinion” SPLs. Reasonable minds may disagree
on some of the points, but it is important that they are
acknowledged and debated. Beyond the immediate out-
come for stakeholders in a specific liquidation, a preva-
lence of “second opinion” SPLs may have negative
consequences for insolvency practice and outcomes in
external administrations.
Firstly, as noted by Brereton J, it is undesirable for
liquidators to have to “answer at every step … for the
exercise of … [their] powers and discretions in the
management and realisation of the [company’s] prop-
erty”.30 Is it reasonable to expect liquidators to have
their conduct and decision-making questioned and then
reviewed for no demonstrated reason other than the
mere wish of a creditor?
A second issue is efficiency in winding up a compa-
ny’s affairs. The importance of a liquidator’s timeliness
and diligence in conducting a winding up has long been
recognised by courts and professional standards.31 There
are public policy arguments for promoting the finality of
commercial decisions and judgments reasonably made
by liquidators. More “second opinion” SPLs — revisit-
ing competent, commercial judgments of professional
insolvency practitioners — will prolong liquidations and
delay their finalisation. The incumbent liquidator in
Walton Constructions had been appointed to replace 
original liquidators whose independence had been found 
wanting by the Full Federal Court.32 The “second 
opinion” SPL in Walton Constructions appears to be the 
third liquidator in that winding up. Apparently, not only 
does the law require an independent liquidator’s per-
spective on a potential claim, it may also further demand 
the “different perspective” of a SPL.
Thirdly, there is authority for the proposition that a 
court, when considering whether to replace an existing 
liquidator, should consider the potential effect on the 
professional reputation and standing of the incumbent.33 
Do these considerations not equally apply to incumbent 
liquidators who have done their level best and acquitted 
themselves competently and properly?
Fourthly, will “second opinion” SPLs (funded by a 
creditor) be more inclined to initiate speculative litiga-
tion that an incumbent has previously assessed as 
improper to pursue? If so, will that have an effect on the 
commercial judgment of incumbent liquidators who will 
be mindful that any decision not to sue may be reviewed 
at the behest of any creditor that chooses to “purchase” 
a second opinion? Will more “second opinion” SPLs 
incentivise unmeritorious litigation?
Conclusion
The appointment of a “second opinion” SPL does not 
“outsource” the conduct of a winding up but it does 
appear to devolve matters of commercial judgment that 
have long been understood as the domain of an inde-
pendent, qualified and professional insolvency practitio-
ner. Courts are usually reluctant to conclude that a 
liquidator’s independence is compromised due to a 
connection with a creditor such as a funding arrange-
ment. Indeed, there has been judicial encouragement of 
the practice.34 However, the advent of “hired gun” SPLs 
may create new threats to independence and the integrity 
of the winding up process.
It is hoped that courts, when engaging with open 
questions regarding the proper construction of the rel-
evant legislation, will give more attention and consider-
ation to the legitimate legal and policy concerns surrounding 
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